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A typical problem with approaches to aesthetic questions which draw 
heavily on the views of a single philosopher is that those who are en-
gaged in the debate over the philosophical problem to which his or her 
views are applied may often have trouble seeing the relevance of the 
proposed account. This is not the case with Hanne Appelqvist’s work 
Wittgenstein and the Conditions of Musical Communication. She develops 
a highly persuasive variant of musical formalism based on a reading of 
remarks on the analogy between the understanding of music and the un-
derstanding of language found in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later writings. 
With this sort of Wittgensteinian formalism she challenges an influen-
tial tradition in contemporary philosophy of music in which music’s con-
tent is considered to consist of the expression of emotions and in which 
musical understanding is seen as the capacity to grasp the emotion a par-
ticular musical phrase or piece supposedly expresses. Simultaneously, 
Appelqvist manages to provide a rehabilitation of the musical formalism 
developed by Eduard Hanslick who contemporary analytic philosophers 
of music have, in her opinion, undeservedly looked down on.
The first two chapters of Appelqvist’s work explore the relationship 
between the early and later parts of Wittgenstein’s philosophical career. 
While it is well-known that Wittgenstein’s thinking changed radically in 
certain respects between the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations, 
in Appelqvist’s view, the concerns of the two works nevertheless overlap in 
that they both attempt “to give an account of the necessary conditions of 
meaning in language” (41). Wittgenstein’s position on the question regard-
ing the nature of those conditions changed radically. In the Tractatus, Witt-
genstein assumes that the conditions of meaning are based on a structural 
isomorphism between language and reality. In the Investigations, those 
conditions are in turn given by the shared, rule-governed practices of the 
various language games which make up a linguistic community.
The musical formalism Appelqvist develops in her work is based on 
the account of Wittgenstein’s later work she offers. Appelqvist defends 
Kalle Poulakka
88
a Kantian reading of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. That is, somewhat 
similar to Kant’s effort to uncover the conditions of knowledge, in Appel-
qvist’s opinion, Wittgenstein offers “a transcendental argument about 
what makes communication possible” (43). In this respect Appelqvist 
rejects recent readings of Wittgenstein’s philosophy according to which 
its goals are primarily therapeutic in character, and which claim that 
Wittgenstein does not put forward any positive philosophical views.
The Kantian understanding of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy points to 
the inherent normative character of understanding. That is, it is meaning-
ful to talk about understanding only if there are criteria for separating 
cases of understanding from cases of misunderstanding. For Wittgenstein, 
these criteria are provided by the rules involved in the different language 
games of a particular linguistic community. Those rules have normative 
force in the sense that they determine which uses of language are correct 
and which are incorrect (50). Without these sorts of sharable rules, which 
provide the criteria for the correct application of linguistic items, it would 
not be meaningful to talk about understanding in the first place, for in 
that case there would be no possibility for determining whether a given 
linguistic item has been applied correctly or incorrectly. Precisely in this 
sense the rules of language serve as the conditions of understanding.
In Appelqvist’s view, when Wittgenstein’s remarks on music are com-
bined with his later account of language there remains very little doubt 
that Wittgenstein held a formalistic view of music according to which 
musical understanding consists of the ability to follow the grammatical 
rules of music. Appelqvist also argues that that view overlaps in some 
significant ways with the musical formalism Eduard Hanslick developed 
some 150 years ago. However, Appelqvist’s approach is not merely ex-
egetical by nature, but she uses the formalistic view of music she draws 
from Wittgenstein’s work to challenge some influential philosophical 
accounts of music in contemporary aesthetics. While she does discuss 
some earlier accounts in which the content of music is already tightly 
connected to human emotions, the edge of her criticism is directed to-
wards more recent forms, primarily the emotive-content views of music 
developed by Stephen Davies, Jerrold Levinson, and Peter Kivy. What 
the views of these three philosophers share is an assumption that mu-
sic’s ability to express emotions is based on resemblances between musi-
cal configurations and the listener’s responses to them on the one hand, 
and other configurations, such as human emotive behaviour, which are 
connected and associated with particular emotions on the other. One 
reason why the emotive-content view has been considered a persuasive 
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account of music is that people have been assumed to hear music as ex-
pressive of emotions and that it would be hard to explain some features 
related to music, such as its educational potential, without this kind of as-
sumption. It is also assumed that there, in fact, exists wide-ranging agree-
ment between competent listeners on which emotions particular musi-
cal passages and phrases express. For many emotive-content theorists, 
the fact that there is this sort of wide-ranging agreement is a sign that 
musical understanding should be equated with the capacity to recognize 
the emotive content of a particular musical phrase or piece (88).
Appelqvist’s criticism of emotive-content theories is forceful not only 
because it convincingly denies the existence of the kind of consensus be-
tween different listeners’ responses to musical works that emotive-con-
tent theories rely on, but because it argues that even if such a consensus 
between responses did exist that would still not help the emotive-content 
theorist formulate a persuasive account of musical understanding. This 
is because the features which are central to the emotive-content account 
cannot ultimately serve the kind of role the emotive-content theorist as-
signs them. That is, they cannot serve as the criteria of understanding. 
This is where the musical formalism Appelqvist develops on the basis of 
Wittgenstein’s views becomes important for her criticism. According to 
that view, it is a condition of understanding that there must be sharable 
criteria for separating cases of understanding from cases of misunder-
standing. In Appelqvist’s opinion, emotive-content theories of music fail 
to provide a basis precisely for this kind of discrimination. The factors by 
which emotive-content accounts of music explain musical understand-
ing are not ultimately able to achieve the kind of normative force for 
discriminating between cases of understanding and cases of misunder-
standing. They cannot in other words provide a compelling account of 
why attributing a given emotional content to a musical phrase should be 
taken as a sign of its understanding rather than its misunderstanding.
To illuminate that this is indeed the case Appelqvist compares attri-
butions of emotive content with the practice of wine tasting. She argues 
that while there are methods of checking whether a given wine has the 
taste a particular person attributes to it, as well as sharable criteria for 
determining whether a given wine has a particular quality or not, this, 
in Appelqvist’s view, is not the case with emotive attributions of music. 
That is, unlike in the case of wine tasting, there are for example no books 
or other sources one can rely on for determining the emotive content of a 
particular musical phrase. Since the possibility of an independent method 
of checking and the existence of sharable criteria are what makes it sen sible 
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to talk about understanding in the first place, musical included, attribu-
tions of emotional content cannot form a basis of musical under standing. 
Ex pression of emotions should not be taken to form the content of music. 
Instead, “musical themes and phrases say something by putting the rules 
of music in use”, and musical understanding consists of the capacity to 
know the various ways in which they may be put in use (147).
The argument Appelqvist presents against emotive-content theories of 
music in her work is exhaustively dense, but at the same time it is utterly 
compelling. However, it is a different question how articulate an account 
of musical understanding Appelqvist manages to formulate in its place. 
It seems that this issue depends on what one takes the general character 
of the musical formalism Appelqvist outlines in the work to be. That is, 
whether it should be taken as purely negative in character or whether it 
should be seen as an attempt to formulate something positive in place of 
the view it tries to undermine. Appelqvist for example writes that “musical 
formalism … is a criticism by its nature” (66), the critical tone it involves be-
ing directed primarily towards the claim that music is expressive of emo-
tions. Then again, it seems that she does not find her account of music 
purely negative, but that it ultimately presents a positive view of what mu-
sical understanding amounts to. However, the ultimate content of the posi-
tive side of that view could be formulated in a more articulated manner. 
That is, the emotive-content theories, despite their intuitive com pelling 
quality, are perhaps nothing but “houses of cards” which get destroyed in 
the hands of the Wittgensteinian fo rmalist. However, it would be a good 
thing for the Wittgensteinian to be more specific about what she intends 
to build on the ruins of the houses of cards she has successfully broken 
down. I shall outline two suggestions as to where the Wittgensteinian for-
malist could begin building the positive side of her theory.
First, Appelqvist notes that it is an inherent element of Wittgenstein’s 
notion of rule-following that “understanding comes in degrees” (16). This 
means that some people understand music better than others, which is 
to say that some examples of musical rule-following are a sign of more 
comprehensive and deeper understanding of music than other kinds of 
cases. One way of developing the positive contribution of formalism is to 
provide an account of how these different cases of musical rule-following 
relate to each other. It also seems that musical understanding does not 
come merely in degrees, but it also comes in kinds. For example, Jerrold 
Levinson has devoted a lot of attention to the connection between critical 
interpretation of music on the one hand and performative interpreta-
tion of music on the other. One consequence which may be drawn from 
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Levinson’s views is that performing music exhibits a different kind of 
understanding of music than the ability to give a full-fledged analysis of, 
say, a given counter-point used by Bach. The formalist does not see an es-
sential difference between these two activities, for she argues that perfor-
mative, that is, “non-structural properties of music are equally subject to 
rules, i.e., shared conventions” (116), as are the different structural prop-
erties of music. But is this really the case? For example, Valery Gergiev 
conducts the orchestra with an armoury of gestures all of his own which 
bear very little resemblance to the gestures Finnish conductors schooled 
by Jorma Panula utilize while conducting. To be sure, Gergiev’s style does 
owe something to the Russian school in that he tends to show the beat 
with a rotating gesture – a pattern his teacher, the eminent Ilja Musin, 
called the life buoy of a conductor – rather than with an up and down 
motion. But still, if you have seen Gergiev conduct, you know that that is 
about the only resemblance you will find to any convention of conduct-
ing. Nevertheless, somehow he manages to get the job done, i.e., to obtain 
the particular kind of sound from the orchestra he wishes.
 This is to say that I see very little point in explaining Gergiev’s mu-
sicianship in terms of rules and conventions. This example thus speaks 
against the idea that performative cases of music are rule-guided in a 
sense similar to the way structural properties of music are. The formalist 
of course does not claim that musical conventions and rules are rock-
solid and neither does she deny the possibility of breaking the rules and 
conventions. However, it does not really seem accurate to describe Ger-
giev’s style of conducting as either a case of breaking the rules or a case 
of inventing a new set of rules for future generations to follow. To my 
mind, this analysis of Gergiev’s musicianship points out that in the case 
of performing music we seem to talk of understanding music in a more 
specific sense. Sometimes critics disapprove of a particular performance, 
because they think the performance shows that the performer does 
not understand the piece performed. For example, Norman Lebrecht, 
the fiercest music critic today, condemned Gergiev’s cycle of Shostak-
ovich’s symphonies some years ago by saying that they were performed 
in too romantic a way. In these kinds of cases, understanding does not 
seem to concern mere musical phrases, but much larger musical items. 
Now, the formalist would surely reject that it is not meaningful to talk 
of prop erties of musical works beyond our musical practices. This is to 
say that it cannot be determined independently of these practices which 
properties a performance must exhibit to count as a successful one. The 
formalist would also surely deny that musical works possess some kind 
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of extra-musical content or representational features which a good per-
formance must convey to the audience. For these reasons, there cannot 
be the kinds of grounds for evaluating musical performances as for ex-
ample Lebrecht’s review of Gergiev’s performances of Shostakovich’s 
symphonies presumes and the formalist could even conclude that talk 
of understanding of whole pieces of music is not really meaningful. But 
still, the world of music is filled with this kind of talk. So, if it is again just 
an example of houses of cards we can destroy without losing anything 
interesting, the formalist needs to show that this is really the case or at 
least try to locate a place for them she finds fitting. 
It is worth noting that the formalism Appelqvist develops in the work is 
not as extreme as it might first appear, for it does not maintain that emo-
tive terms should be removed from our musical vocabulary altogether. 
It just tries to outline a different place for emotive descriptions from the 
one the emotive-content theorist assigns them. That is, the use of emotive 
terms cannot be taken as a sign of musical understanding, but this does not 
mean that emotive terms could not be used for other legitimate purposes. 
Appelqvist for example claims that emotive descriptions of music “may 
sometimes help in the process of listening to music or performing it” (19). 
Appelqvist in fact argues that the kind of reconsideration of the status of 
emotional terms in descriptions of music she offers resolves a contradiction 
which many have accused Hanslick’s formalism to be troubled by. Although 
Hanslick rejected the idea that music could be expressive of emotions, he 
nevertheless frequently used emotive and other kinds of extra-musical 
terms in his music criticism. Appelqvist thinks there is no contradiction 
between these sides of Hanslick’s work, for they do not necessarily stand 
in the kind of mutually exclusive relationship with each other as the criti-
cism assumes. However, since emotive descriptions are commonly used in 
describing music, and since the ultimate purpose of the formalist is not to 
remove them from our vocabulary, but just to locate a new status for them, 
it seems that one possibility for the formalist to develop the positive side of 
her account is to articulate their status in a more specific way. With regard 
to which purposes can emotive descriptions be helpful? And what does 
their helpfulness amount to if emotive descriptions do not bear any kind of 
necessary connection to musical understanding?
Appelqvist’s work provides an impressive rehabilitation of musical 
formalism, and the account of music outlined in it has every possibility 
of making musical formalism a serious contender within philosophy of 
music after decades of regrettable neglect.
kalle puolakka
